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Abstract 
While the turn towards materiality over the course of the last decade has enriched studies 
of security in a variety of ways, the security field continues to pose challenges for materially 
oriented thinking. This article argues that while recent materially oriented work on security 
has been concerned with events, working through the question of the event as a central 
analytical strategy is a promising way of addressing such challenges and developing broader 
insights. The article develops this argument by working through a particular event, the 
killing of the former Russian security agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 by 
means of the radioactive element polonium 210. Approaching the event via the archive and 
report of the public inquiry that subsequently took place into it, and reflecting further on 
the utility of Bruno Latour’s idea of dingpolitik for materially oriented work on security, the 
article explores transformations of materiality, politics and publicity, and draws out how 
polonium 210 came to figure in the killing and the inquiry as actant, trace and evidence. In 
conclusion, the article reflects on the conceptual value of working through events and 
the methodological issues raised in the analysis. 
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Introduction 
Like many scholars across the social sciences and humanities, theorists of security (e.g. 
Aradau 2010; Adey and Anderson 2012; Walters 2014; Amicelle et al. 2015; Salter 2015, 
2016) have in recent years become increasingly interested in questions of materiality, in 
terms of the roles that materials, technologies, devices, substances and objects of all kinds 
play in security problems and practices. While this turn towards materiality has enriched 
studies of security, however, the security field (Bigo 2002) continues to pose distinctive 
challenges for materially-oriented thinking. One challenge relates to the irreducibly political 
character of security, in terms of its immersion in disagreement, antagonism and contention 
(Walters 2014; Barry 2013a). While a consideration of these distinctively political issues is 
extended by attention to the ways in which they are played out via material settings, bodies, 
technologies and practices, they resist reduction to a materialist analysis. A related but 
distinct set of issues arises when we consider the relationship of security to questions of the 
public, or, to use a familiar term in a slightly unfamiliar manner, its publicity, (de Goede 
2014; Thomas 2015), in that the process of making matters of security public is invariably 
complicated by their immersion in secrecy and deception (Barry 2013a; Horn 2013; Walters 
2014, 2015). Though these issues are not unique to security, they acquire particular force 
because of the intimate connections between security, sovereign power and the state of 
exception (Horn 2003; Agamben 2005). 
 These issues have been framed and explored in existing work with reference to 
Bruno Latour’s idea of dingpolitik, which have been used to examine controversies 
surrounding the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London in 2005 (de Goede 2014) and drone strikes 
conducted against Palestinian targets by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as part of its Cast 
Lead operation in 2009 (Walters 2014). What this work shows is that while Latour’s ideas 
are suggestive for exploring how materiality figures in security and how matters of security 
may be made public, they cannot simply be applied (Walters 2014: 112) to provide ready-
made understanding of the security field (also Barry 2013a; Salter and Walters 2016). 
Rather, the distinctive politics and publicity of security also need working through as part of 
any materially-oriented analysis (Walters 2015). Material things animate, constitute and 
complicate security in ways that are interesting and important, but the ways in which 
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materiality comes to matter in relation to security, and the ways in which matters of 
security may be made public, are mediated by the political and public qualities of the 
security field itself. 
This article responds to William Walters’ (2014: 106) call for ‘conceptual and 
methodological innovation’ in materially-oriented studies of security to address such issues. 
Its main conceptual contribution lies in foregrounding the question of the event, not just as 
an ontological and epistemological concern, but as an analytical strategy and device. 
Materially-oriented inquiries into security have often been concerned with events, but work 
engaging with Latour has so far foregrounded his ideas on disputes and controversies rather 
than the event per se. Working not just on, but through, events is revealing, I argue, in terms 
of how this directs attention to the ways in which things of all kinds come to act, interact, 
intra-act, enact and alter each other in the course of intensive transformations. It is not just 
that the security field complicates the ontologies of objects, nor that objects are fluid and 
mutable, but that, in the course of an event, the orders of materiality, politics and publicity 
themselves intersect with, and cross over into, each other. Events disrupt the world as well 
as ways of ordering and knowing about it, and are therefore implicated in security at a 
fundamental level (Foucault 2007; Anderson 2010). If a central injunction of actor-network 
theory has been to ‘follow the actors’ (Latour 2005b; Barry 2013a), here the emphasis is on 
trying to ‘follow the event’ and the ontological and epistemological transformations it 
entails. 
The arguments of the article are developed empirically by working through a 
particular event, the killing of the former Russian security agent Alexander Litvinenko in 
London in 2006 by means of the radioactive element polonium 210. The article approaches 
the event via the archive and report of the Litvinenko Inquiry, (hereafter sometimes ‘the 
Inquiry’), which was launched in the context of tensions between Britain and Russia over the 
Ukraine crisis, and in the immediate aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 
MH17 over eastern Ukraine in July 2014 in particular. Its main methodological contribution 
lies in its layered reading of the archive and report of the Inquiry, which, focusing in on 
polonium 210 and its associations, affordances and effects, reveals transformations in 
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materiality, politics and publicity, mediations of security, and the distinct registers through 
which polonium 210 has come to figure in the event.  
 The article proceeds in the following sequence. First, it considers how the themes of 
materiality, politics and publicity have been framed in recent work on security, particularly 
in relation to Bruno Latour’s (2005a) idea of dingpolitik, or thing-politics. The section then 
rethinks issues of materiality, politics and publicity via a consideration of the event, 
exploring the material dimensions to events and the ways in which they assemble, and are 
reassembled by, inquiries-in-public. The article then works through the Litvinenko case in 
three stages, showing how the orders of materiality, politics and publicity intersected with 
and transformed each other by tracing the multiple affordances, mutations and enactments 
of polonium 210 in the course of the event. Working through the case in this way shows 
how the materiality of polonium 210 comes to matter in the killing and Inquiry in inter-
related, but distinct, registers, as actant, trace and evidence of the event. In conclusion, the 
article reflects briefly on the conceptual value of working through events and the 
methodological interest of public inquiries in light of the Litvinenko case. 
 
Materiality, politics and publicity in the field of security 
Materiality, politics and publicity form a useful conceptual triad for exploring issues of 
security (Walters 2014, 2015). Linking materiality with a consideration of what might be 
distinctive to politics on the one hand and the constitution and nature of the public sphere 
on the other allows us to highlight how materiality acts and is deployed, enacted and 
encountered amid and in relation to conflict, dispute and enmity on the one hand, and 
disclosure, visibility and secrecy on the other. In this section, I consider how these issues 
have been framed in work engaging with the ideas of Bruno Latour, before consider how 
working through the event as an analytical strategy can help in addressing some of the 
challenges that arise from this engagement. 
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Thinking security with and beyond Latour  
As Walters (2014) and de Goede (2014) explore, Latour’s work offers a number of resources 
for materially-oriented thinking on security. Actor-network theory, to which Latour has been 
central (but see also Barry 2013a), is highly suggestive in terms of its insistence that action 
always takes place through complex constellations of non-human as well as human entities, 
that these are only provisionally stabilised in particular arrangements, and that producing, 
managing and dealing with actor-networks involves highly specialised technical work. In its 
injunctions to follow actors (or ‘actants’) and to take seriously the work of expertise, actor-
network theory also suggests practical methodological orientations for reconceptualising 
and investigating the workings of security knowledges, technologies and practices (Walters 
2014). Latour’s later work on dingpolitik (Latour 2005a) and the practices through which 
things are made public (Latour 2005a; Latour and Weibel 2005) is also relevant in pointing 
up the ways in which ‘objects’ may disrupt and complicate existing arrangements and how 
they might be more fully understood as resonant ‘things’ that are able to engender 
controversies and assemble publics in their own right. 
 In Latour’s argument (which owes an acknowledged debt to Walter Lippmann and 
John Dewey, via the work of Noortje Marres, 2005; Latour 2005a), theories of politics and 
democracy organised around the idea of representation – of words representing things, and 
people representing collectives – are held to be limiting in that they constrain the kinds of 
objects, actors and knowledges that can be recognised as being involved in any situation 
and the ways in which they may appear in public deliberations. Rather than being based on 
assertions of fact, politics needs to be reconceived, Latour argues, around issues, objects 
and matters of concern in ways that are open to deliberation. There is therefore both a 
normative and analytical dimension to dingpolitik. Politics becomes a matter of assembling a 
‘parliament of things’ that might constitute a new public around each matter of concern. As 
Latour (2005a: 5, also cited in Walters 2014: 104) explains, ‘Each object gathers around itself 
a different assembly of relevant parties. Each object triggers new occasions to passionately 
differ and dispute. Each object may also offer new ways of achieving closure without having 
to agree on much else’. Latour’s (admittedly, experimental) suggestion both points towards 
the heterogeneity of things that might be, or become, involved in politics, and invites us to 
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consider how they, via representatives who speak for them, might reconfigure publics and 
politics. 
Something that interests both Walters (2014) and de Goede (2014) are the ways in 
which existing forms of inquiries-in-public, such as inquests or public inquiries, might be said 
to embody some features of dingpolitik. Latour’s ideas have been taken up by de Goede 
(2014) in an analysis of the inquests that took place into the deaths of people killed in the 
bombings on the London transport network in July 2005. While the remit of these inquests 
was in principle tightly defined, de Goede argues that, in exploring the difficulty of 
anticipating and preventing attacks on the basis of often fragmented and ambiguous 
images, recordings and other information, the proceedings transformed the rationalities 
and practices of security, in a Latourian manner, from matters of fact into matters of 
concern. At the same time, however, de Goede shows how the incipiently political questions 
this might have raised were obviated by an imaginary of pervasive threat that was also 
deployed throughout the proceedings, which reinstalled the need for constant vigilance and 
the possibility of forceful action as preconditions of freedom. De Goede’s analysis therefore 
shows how, while material objects can prompt deliberation on matters of concern, the 
extent to which such objects can reassemble politics continues to be framed by the avowed 
necessity of illiberal techniques of security. Here Walters (2014, 2015) reminds us that 
security entails secrecy, denial, qualification, obfuscation and absence, compromising our 
knowledge of things and the political roles they might pay, or simply preventing such 
knowledge from having political effect., 
 Related problems attend the question of the public. In Latour’s thinking, publics 
ought to be assembled by, and in relation to, matters of concern and the heterogeneous 
actors and objects involved in them. In this sense, we might say that in de Goede’s (2014) 
account of the 7/7 inquests, material evidence concerning the event was permitted to 
assemble certain kinds of representatives, who could speak of its significance to the chair 
and the audience, which included family members of people killed in the event and 
members of the press. The bombings and the evidence pertaining to them, it might be said, 
were allowed, through the technique of the inquest, to assemble a public that would engage 
in deliberations about the inferences and conclusions that might be drawn. While the chair 
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of the inquests was able to obtain an unusual degree of access to security service material 
and personnel, and to push the limits of her remit to explore questions not originally 
envisaged in the terms of the proceedings, making this a particularly interesting case (de 
Goede 2014), the scope of inquiry, the evidence considered, the modes in which testimony 
was given and the kinds of conclusions that could be drawn were constrained by legal 
frameworks and by exceptions obtained by the security services. 
While the 7/7 inquests in some respects exceeded what might have been expected 
of them, the proceedings therefore fell short of meeting Latour’s criteria for enacting 
dingpolitik. As Latour, channelling Lippmann, explains, the ‘parliament of things’ only works 
if ‘The assembling is done under the provisional and fragile Phantom Public, which no longer 
claims to be equivalent to a Body, a Leviathan or a State’ (Latour 2005a: 31). Officially 
constituted inquiries, especially those constituted in relation to security, being framed and 
loaded in favour of ‘the state’, do not meet this criterion, but they are nevertheless often 
occasions in which ‘objects’ are considered more in the manner of ‘things’, and some of 
their properties and stories disclosed. A public inquiry may not be a parliament of things, 
but may, as an exercise in doing politics with things, make security public in new ways. 
Materially-oriented work has shown, objects and the actor-networks of which they 
form part play a variety of roles in forming, unsettling and reconfiguring politics and publics, 
and that attending to such processes enhances our understanding of security. What work on 
public inquiries into matters of security further reveals are some of the ontological and 
epistemological limits and problems engendered by the security field in relation to 
questions of materiality. The assembling of security issues in public inquiries is in part an 
effect of the materiality of things, and it offers opportunities to examine the material nature 
and workings of security, but the assembly process remains implicated with the security 
field itself, which in turn mediates what is made public and how. To explore and address 
these issues further it is useful to foreground the question of the event. 
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Thinking materiality, politics and publicity through the event 
If a focus on objects, things and actor-networks can be revealing of what security is and how 
it works, this is often because of the manner in which those objects and networks are 
involved in intense transformations, in the course of which they act, interact, enact and are 
altered in relation to each other and their surroundings (Law 2004). If ‘object-oriented 
ontology’ (Latour 2005a: 4) asserts that anything can be thought of as being an object, this 
approach tends to under-rate the complex, energetic and processual nature of things like 
protests, battles, coups, revolutions, assassinations, bombings, epidemics, chemical 
reactions or the decay of nuclear materials. Indeed, as Gilles Deleuze (2015, p.151) suggests, 
an event is not really a material thing at all, but an ‘incorporeal’ transformation that is only 
expressed in the naming of intensive, energetic and often violent rearrangements and 
alterations of bodies and states of affairs. For Deleuze, the event is the transformation, not 
the agents of transformation or things that are transformed, and something of it always 
escapes conscious knowledge and appropriation. Events should not be reduced to material 
processes and transformations, then, but are recognised and inferred via them, and on the 
basis of the material traces that they enact, as well as the narrative accounts that they 
engender. Following the actors (or ‘actants’) and the ways in which they transform and are 
transformed thus becomes a way of getting at events. 
 The particular qualities of events that are liable to give rise to an officially 
constituted public inquiry in Britain are expressed in the first article of the Inquiries Act of 
2005, under which the Litvinenko Inquiry took place. This states that: 
(1) A Minister may cause an inquiry to be held under this Act in relation to a case where it appears to 
him that— 
(a) particular events have caused, or are capable of causing, public concern, or 
(b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred. (Inquiries Act 2005: 1) 
The premise for an inquiry could thus be an actual event about which there is concern, or an 
event that might cause concern, or a concern that an event might have taken place. The key 
issue is not necessarily events per se, but their potentially public and concerning qualities. 
A consideration of inquiries-in-public (of which inquests are one variety and public 
inquiries another) via dingpolitik allows us to emphasise something slightly different from 
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work on governmentality, which highlights the ways in which British public inquiries, taking 
place under the authority of a government minister but proceeding independently of them, 
function nevertheless as techniques of government rather than enlightenment (Thomas 
2015). What I would like to draw out are the ways in which public inquiries ostensibly 
pursue an ontology and epistemology of the event. To the extent that they focus on objects, 
as well as causes and effects and acts of commission and omission, what ostensibly 
motivates and ties inquiries together is a sense that ‘something happened’ and the kinds of 
knowledge and judgements that are possible about this. 
 In a meditation on the nature of events following the 9/11 attacks in New York, 
Jacques Derrida (2003) makes a distinction between the ‘event’ and the ‘impressions’ that it 
makes in individual experience and media reporting, suggesting, following eighteenth 
century empiricism, that it is via its impressions that we try to appropriate the event. Here 
we can add something beyond this, noting how events are also appropriated more 
specifically via the material transformations in which they participate and the traces they 
leave. In the terms of actor-network theory and the more Deleuzian vocabulary of 
ontopolitics (Law 2004), these transformations and traces do not just ‘happen’, but are 
‘enacted’ via specialist, technical investigations, which assemble expert knowledge about 
events, thus reframing our sense of what the event is. As well as hearing testimony from 
witnesses and interested parties, inquiries-in-public assemble such evidence and expertise 
as a basis for producing authoritative judgements about the event. A public inquiry is 
therefore a meta-level technique of the event in that it assembles, reflects upon and 
adjudicates between accounts produced by other techniques. In so doing, it takes place not 
just ‘in public’, but facilitates the assembly ‘of’ a public around objects, issues and disputes 
of concern, proceeding according to the logic of the event at hand. Inquiries-in-public offer a 
way to follow the event as it is reassembled and enacted amid ongoing disputes and 
struggles and in relation to claims of national security. What can also emerge from a careful 
reading of inquiries into events in which material things have played a significant role is a 
sense of how, in the course of events, materiality, politics and publics take on new forms 
and pass across into each other, but also of the absent presences that indicate not just limits 
to knowledge, but the workings of security. 
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The Litvinenko affair 
Alexander Litvinenko joined the Soviet Interior Ministry forces and Committee for State 
Security (KGB) and later the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), serving during the 
Chechen wars of the 1990s and then in the fight against organised crime (Felshtinsky and 
Litvinenko 2007; Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2012; Harding 2016; Litvinenko Inquiry 2016; 
Satter 2016). Becoming increasingly disillusioned with what he saw as the corruption around 
him, and having aroused antipathy among superiors in his efforts to voice his concerns, he 
became a vocal public opponent of Vladimir Putin during the latter’s ascendancy to the 
Presidency of Russia, and developed an association with the controversial oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky, who, having facilitated Putin’s rise to power, then sought to remove him. In the 
face of threats to his liberty and, he believed, his life, Litvinenko fled Russia, settling in 
London with his wife and son. There they gained British citizenship and Litvinenko, it would 
appear, formed new relationships with British and European intelligence agencies, while 
continuing to oppose Putin in public. In mid-2006, Litvinenko made sensational personal 
allegations against Putin and appeared ready to testify to the nature and reach of Russian 
organised crime and its links with the Russian government in a Spanish court. 
As established by the Litvinenko Inquiry, a secret operation, ‘probably’ (Litvinenko 
Inquiry 2016: 240) sanctioned at the highest levels of the Russian government, led to 
Litvinenko being poisoned with a solution of the unusual and highly radioactive element 
polonium 210 at a meeting with two men in a hotel bar in the upscale London district of 
Mayfair in November 2006. The recognition of the suspicious nature of the illness that 
began later that day, and the subsequent finding that polonium was the causative agent, led 
to a rapid intensification of activity among British nuclear, medical, police, public health and 
intelligence agencies. While Litvinenko’s work in the UK and Europe had been poised 
between the secret and public worlds, the event rapidly acquired an ineluctably public 
character, via massive media interest, the highly visible responses of policing and public 
health bodies to polonium contamination across London, and the propagandistic activities 
of Litvinenko’s London-based Russian associates. While the two Russian men present at the 
fatal meeting, Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitri Kovtun, were charged by the British police with 
murder, and while the British government alleged Russian state responsibility, ministers 
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resisted calls for a full public inquiry into the event until summer 2014, when, in the 
aftermath of the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, it was announced that 
such an inquiry would take place. While decision to allow an inquiry was presumably taken 
on the grounds that it might contribute to delegitimising ongoing Russian government 
actions, its proceedings led to the disclosure of a vast amount of new information 
concerning the case, and it represents by far the most sustained and most extensively 
evidenced account of the event, which in numerous respects corroborates other accounts 
(e.g. Harding 2016) and adds new dimensions to them. Moreover, revolving centrally 
around the ‘polonium trail’ left in and on myriad objects around London and Hamburg and 
on travel routes between London and Moscow, the Inquiry was assembled in relation to, 
and conducted a sustained investigation of, issues of materiality and their political and 
public significance. At the same time, while much of the testimony was taken in public, and 
much of the evidence gathered was made public, some issues (notably, preventability and 
Litvinenko’s relationship with the British intelligence services) were not considered, having 
been judged by the Chair not to be relevant. Furthermore, some witnesses gave testimony 
in secret and some evidence was not disclosed, being described in the report as ‘closed’, on 
grounds of national security. The killing and the inquiry therefore offer rich potential for 
exploring the issues framed in the discussion so far. 
 In the following sections, I work through the killing and the Inquiry three times over, 
drawing out three registers in which the materiality of polonium 210 has come to figure in 
the event, as actant, trace, and evidence. The term actant connotes the sense in which 
polonium operated as the focal point of an actor-network, in terms of how it was used, and 
worked as, a poisonous agent in the death of Litvinenko. This account of polonium as actant 
is dependent in turn on the ways in which it has been further enacted via expert knowledge 
practices as a trace of an event, into which it appears to offer unusual insight. I then 
consider how polonium 210 came to figure again in the juridical register of evidence, initially 
in terms of police investigations and in the initial inquest into Litvinenko’s death, but most 
particularly in the context of the Litvinenko Inquiry, where traces and testimonies regarding 
the event were assembled, analysed and adjudicated. As I discuss, distinct enactments and 
transformations of materiality, politics and publicity can be identified within each register. 
These registers are not independent of each other, however, and the ability to identify and 
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distinguish them in the manner presented here is largely a product of the public character of 
the Inquiry itself. While much might be known and inferred from the archive and report of 
the Inquiry, however, these sources came to exist in the midst of a contentious international 
situation, and are framed by legal procedure and the exigencies of national security. Though 
these sources allow us to work through the event in detail and in different ways, drawing 
out a sense of its multiplicity and its entanglement in other events, they are also instructive 
in terms of the challenges of thinking materially about security more broadly. 
 
Actant 
Shortly before 4pm on the afternoon of 1 November 2006, a solution of the radioactive 
element polonium 210 somehow made it into a teapot that was sitting on a table in the Pine 
Bar of the Millennium Hotel in Mayfair, in London’s West End. Immediately before 4pm, 
Alexander Litvinenko arrived at the hotel, responding to an invitation from another Russian 
man, Dmitri Kovtun, who was present along with a third, Andrei Lugovoy.1 After a short 
conversation, and as Kovtun and Lugovoy readied to leave, Lugovoy mentioned to 
Litvinenko that there was still some tea in the pot that he could drink if he so wished. A 
waiter brought a clean cup, Litvinenko poured, and drank a small amount of the liquid. At 
that moment, his death from radiation poisoning became inevitable. This, then, is the focal 
point of the event, in which actor-networks converge, interact, intensify and transform, and 
from which the event ripples out, altering bodies, time and space.  
 Litvinenko fell ‘suddenly and unexpectedly’ ill overnight on 1 November 2006 
(Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 33). He began vomiting continuously and early on 3 November, his 
wife, Marina Litvinenko, called for an ambulance. He was not hospitalized, however, but 
began complaining of ‘pain’ and experiencing ‘bloody diarrhoea’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 
34). On the afternoon of 4 November, Marina again called for an ambulance and Litvinenko 
was admitted to Barnet Hospital in north London. An array of tests were carried out and 
Litvinenko was prescribed a course of antibiotics, but further tests on his blood determined 
that the platelet count and red and white cell counts were falling. His hair also began falling 
out. Over the next three weeks Litvinenko’s condition deteriorated; by 16 November his 
‘bone marrow had degenerated and contained no discernible normal blood forming 
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elements’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 35). At this point Litvinenko was transferred to 
University College Hospital in central London. The deterioration of his condition could not 
be alleviated and he died on 23 November. 
 The Litvinenko Inquiry found the cause of death to be poisoning by polonium 210 
and this element can be said to have been the central actant of the event, but one that is 
neither a stable object, nor independent from the myriad practices and networks through 
which it is created and used, and through which it comes to affect other things. Polonium 
210 is a radioactive isotope that has a half life of 138 days, and in the course of its decay 
into lead it emits a continuous stream of alpha particles. Given their relatively large atomic 
size (equivalent to a helium atom), alpha particles are readily intercepted by thin screens 
such as paper, clothing or skin. They may, however, pass through permeable membranes, 
whereupon they transfer their kinetic energy into the cells they encounter, causing severe 
destruction and inflammation. This makes the ingestion of polonium highly dangerous. 
While its elemental form is metallic, polonium readily forms a number of compounds, 
including ‘water-soluble, colourless salts’ (Nathwani et al. 2016: 1079). Having been 
ingested by Litvinenko in liquid form, polonium was distributed around his body and came 
to inflict radiation damage on his bone marrow, kidneys, liver and other organs, 
‘substantially in excess of doses that could be survived by any person’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 
2015a: 5). It was ‘cautiously’ estimated that even one per cent of the dose ingested could 
have proved fatal (Litvinenko Inquiry 2015a: 9). Such massive quantities of polonium were 
detected in Litvinenko’s body that it was itself treated as a hazardous radioactive object, 
The pathologist who conducted the post-mortem endorsed its description as ‘one of the 
most dangerous ever conducted in the Western world’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2015b: 42). 
 Actor-network theory understands actants as operating within heterogeneous 
arrangements of things, and highlights the considerable work and multitude of practices 
required to make entities cohere so that they can act (Law 2004). To be sure, the very 
existence of polonium 210 entails a vast array of other such actors and practices, in highly 
specific ways: it is a ‘rare and specialised commodity’ that is ‘difficult to produce and 
dangerous to handle’ and it is ‘only publicly available in minute quantities’ (Litvinenko 
Inquiry 2016: 216). The production of polonium 210 requires a bismuth 209 target to be 
irradiated with neutrons within a specialised reactor. A chemical process is then used to 
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isolate the polonium. As the Inquiry found, only this process could have produced polonium 
in the quantity and purity that was used in the killing of Litvinenko.  The Inquiry further 
found that the quantity and quality of polonium used was ‘at the very least a strong 
indicator of state involvement’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 225).  
The event was assembled, and it converged, around polonium 210, its nuclear 
properties and its physical affordances. But while we can understand its production as the 
effect of a practices and networks, the event also emerged out of, and came to effect, 
distinctively political relations of enmity, via practices of deception. Litvinenko and Lugovoy 
(also a former KGB officer) had known each other in Moscow in the late 1990s as associates 
of Berezovsky, resuming contact in London in 2004 and coming to explore the possibility of 
working with each other and with London-based risk and security companies. Litvinenko’s 
friendly and trusting attitude towards Lugovoy was described by several witnesses to the 
Inquiry, with one stating that Litvinenko had said Lugovoy was trustworthy because they 
had both worked for the KGB and with Russian security agencies; because Lugovoy had, like 
Litvinenko, worked for the oligarch Boris Berezovsky; and because he had (apparently; the 
veracity of this was questioned by the Inquiry) served time in jail for this association 
(Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 86). Though Lugovoy subsequently denied responsibility for 
Litvinenko’s death, he stated in a newspaper interview that he considered him to have been 
a ‘traitor’ and that, in principle, ‘[i]f someone has caused the Russian state serious damage, 
they should be exterminated’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 199). Litvinenko’s former superior 
officer in the FSB stated that he had deserved to be ‘executed’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 67). 
Poisoning by polonium can be said to have served as the material actant of a particular 
determination of the idea ‘death to traitors’ and the specific form of enactment of the 
intention ‘death to this traitor’. 
In the course of the event, polonium became political, coming to express and effect 
relations of enmity and enacting fatal consequences for what was taken to have been a 
betrayal (Horn 2003) and political relations were also thereby materialised. But there was 
also a becoming- and making-public of the event. In the early weeks of November 2006, the 
British media began to unravel the potential import of a former Russian intelligence agent 
suffering symptoms akin to radiation poisoning in a central London hospital. In the days 
before his death, Litvinenko expressed to detectives and associates his certainty that he had 
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been killed by the Russian secret services, on the orders of Putin. Two days before his death, 
Litvinenko’s supporters arranged for a photo to be taken of him in his hospital bed, 
desperately ill and connected up to tubes and wires, bringing a dramatic representation of 
his condition into the public and the political situation that was assembling and intensifying 
around it. They also released a statement in his name, which thanked the British 
government for their care and the public for their support and interest, naming Vladimir 
Putin as ‘the person responsible for my present condition’ and accusing him of being 
‘barbaric and ruthless’. One of Litvinenko’s associates told the The Times (Beeston 2006) 
that among his last words was the phrase ‘the bastards got me. But they won’t get 
everybody’. 
The polonium continued to act, in some ways that were kept secret and others that 
necessarily became public. The discovery by scientists at Britain’s Atomic Weapons 
Establishment (AWE) on the day of Litvinenko’s death that polonium 210 was the cause of 
his deterioration sparked a major emergency response that sought to identify contaminated 
sites and track down every person who might have come into contact with the substance in 
the period in which the attack on Litvinenko had taken place (Health Protection Agency 
2010). The public assembled by the event thereby proliferated, and it was transformed as a 
matter of concern. Sites across London were cordoned off for investigation and hundreds of 
people in Britain and abroad were contacted, invited to give samples for testing and offered 
follow up advice. This response in turn elicited massive media and public interest and, 
among some, affective disquiet, in turn causing health providers to offer further 
reassurance and support (Morgan et al. 2008). By this stage, however, polonium was 
already coming to figure in a different register, to which we turn in more detail. 
 
Trace 
In Reassembling the Social, Latour (2005b: 53) writes: 
 
without transformation in some state of affairs, there is no meaningful argument to be made about 
about a given agency, no detectable frame of reference. An invisible agency that makes no difference, 
produces no transformation, leaves no trace, and enters no account, is not an agency.  
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The solution of polonium employed by Litvinenko’s killers made a difference and left myriad 
traces; indeed, the Report of the Litvinenko Inquiry devotes a whole chapter to what 
became known as ‘the polonium trail’. Traces of polonium, when detected, measured, 
recorded and assembled via expert practices into meaningful form, offered detailed insight 
into some of the crucial spatialities and temporalities of the event. The account of polonium 
210 offered in the preceding section is thus dependent on public access afforded by the 
Inquiry to the accounts and products of the investigations that are described and drawn 
upon here, as summarised in the Report and in documents contained in its public archive. 
Significant quantities of polonium were detected not just in urine samples and in 
Litvinenko’s body itself, but in hair he had shaved off his head after it started to fall out, 
which happened to have remained in a bag in his hospital room (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 
35-36). Traces were also detected by means of a ‘series of tests’ conducted ‘at a series of 
locations’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 110). These tests found traces on a multitude of objects, 
in particular the teapot, located after exhaustive searching at the Millennium Hotel, wherein 
radioactive material had become embedded in residues from tea making that persisted, 
despite repeated washing, on regions inside the bowl and, especially, in the spout, indicative 
of polonium solution having been poured through it (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 177). There 
were correspondences between polonium traces and two previous visits to London, by 
Lugovoy and Kovtun on 16-18 October, and by Lugovoy only on 25-27 October, during 
which, the Inquiry concluded, attempts were also made on Litvinenko’s life. Polonium traces 
also corresponded with visits on 28 October-3 November (by Lugovoy) and 1-3 November 
(by Kovtun), during which the fatal poisoning took place. Kovtun had travelled to London on 
1 November via Hamburg, where traces were also discovered at more than one location and 
on several objects by German police. In London, traces were found, inter alia, on door 
handles, on towels, on a shisha pipe, on restaurant and bar seats, in a nightclub and in a car, 
and on seats at the Emirates Stadium, home to Arsenal Football Club in north London, 
visited by Lugovoy on the evening 1 November 2006 when Arsenal had played CSKA of 
Moscow. Contamination was also found on seats and on an overhead locker in aeroplanes 
working between Moscow and London during the period of interest, on which the persons 
of interest had travelled. As well as on, and in, one particular teapot and on the table upon 
which it had apparently sat, especially high concentrations were found amid the detritus in 
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the u-bend of a sink in the bathroom of a hotel room in which Lugovoy stayed on the first 
visit, and on a meeting table around which the three men had met in the offices of a risk 
and security consultancy in Mayfair; in the bin in the bathroom of a hotel room in which 
Lugovoy stayed on the second visit; and in the sediment trap of the sink in the bathroom of 
the hotel room in which Kovtun stayed on the third visit. Notably high readings of alpha 
radiation were also taken from the cuff of the denim jacket worn by Litvinenko on 1 
November. 
This brief overview illustrates the manner in which remnants of polonium distributed 
around London and beyond enabled a tracing of the event. This process involved police 
forensics experts but also scientists from the AWE and other agencies, who conducted tests 
with alpha particle detectors, which could detect both the presence and approximate 
strength of radiation, with swabs being taken for further testing in cases of significant 
contamination. The results of this investigation were compiled in a 260 page report 
produced to the inquiry that had remained secret but which was made public by it. An 
expert from AWE gave crucial evidence, distinguishing contamination levels into ‘primary’, 
indicative of direct contact with polonium 210, and ‘secondary’, resulting from the 
subsequent transfer of material. As she stated, 
 
The transfer of polonium from primary contamination areas to other areas is dependent upon the 
physical and chemical properties of polonium and the surface of the materials on which it is 
deposited. The amount of contamination transferred is dependent upon the amount of original 
activity present on each successive surface to which it is transferred. (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 111) 
 
Here we are well within the realm of actor-network theory; of experts, devices, materials, 
properties, recordings, of ‘inscription’ and related epistemic practices. As described in the 
report, beyond the ‘primary finding’ that contamination was attributable to polonium 210, 
‘the principal questions that arose were, first, the level of each of the findings, and, second, 
the inferences that could be drawn from the results’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 111). The 
traces do not just ‘exist’, but are ‘enacted’ (Law 2004) via devices and techniques, and are 
assembled to support an account of the event in which they participated and whose passing 
they are taken to record. 
18 
 
The technical infrastructure and expertise making it possible to detect these traces in 
Litvinenko’s body and beyond made a decisive difference to the case (Dombey 2007), 
illustrating ways in which materiality comes to matter. At the same time, the radioactive 
remnants of polonium should be regarded as more than traces of direct and secondary 
contact between a radioactive substance and a series of bodies, objects, sites and surfaces 
that were amenable to scientific investigation. They would not have been enacted as such 
without technical capabilities related to Britain’s status as a nuclear state, a perceived 
radiation threat to public security and the suspicion of the commission of a crime affecting 
someone immersed in the relations of intelligence and espionage between adversary states. 
In other words, there are, from the beginning, political dimensions to the ways in which 
remnants of polonium became traces of an event in virtue of the national security 
implications of nuclear technology, which are further signalled by the anonymous 
identification of the AWE expert as ‘A1’ in the Inquiry. In becoming traces, these remnants 
acquire an epistemic quality that bears the impression of a political situation and which, in 
the course of investigation, serves to confirm the political nature of the event. In terms of 
the Inquiry’s concern with the nature of the event, the presence of traces of a highly rare 
and toxic substance in immediate proximity to certain people, in certain settings, at certain 
times, in certain dispersions and concentrations, becomes explicable and comprehensible in 
terms of a conjunction of enmity, deception and lethal intent, which are in turn explicable in 
relation to other actors and events, that is, in terms of a broader political situation in which 
Litvinenko was also an actant. 
The material traces of polonium 210 do not fully describe either the material, 
political or public dimensions of the event, or fully illuminate the actor-networks involved in 
it, however. There are many other actants (for example, phones) and traces (phone records) 
that were explored in the Inquiry, but also absent presences (Walters 2014). No evidence 
was presented, in public at least, regarding how Lugovoy and Kovtun came by the polonium 
used in each of the attempts on Litvinenko’s life. On this point the barrister representing 
Marina Litvinenko as a core participant in the Inquiry, suggested that as Lugovoy and Kovtun 
had not had opportunity to acquire polonium between their arrival at Gatwick Airport from 
Moscow on the morning of 16 October and their meeting with Litvinenko that afternoon, 
they must have brought it with them. However, Sir Robert Owen, chairing the Inquiry, 
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rejected this proposition due to the lack of evidence concerning their movements that day, 
concluding that he could not ‘exclude... the possibility that they obtained polonium 210 
from some source in London’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 125). Aspects of the event, and 
understanding of the role played in it by polonium 210, including its presumed origins within 
the Russian nuclear complex, therefore remain obscure, at least in terms of the official 
public record.  
 
Evidence 
Traces of the event came to function in a distinct, but related, way as evidence, when they 
were assembled via legal reasoning in the context of the Inquiry. To be sure, polonium 210 
had already acquired an evidential quality before this point. The work of dozens of police 
officers, detectives and forensic specialists on the case was oriented in terms of the 
potential for the traces they detected and gathered coming to function as evidence, in the 
first instance in a possible a criminal trial. However, while Lugovoy and Kovtun were charged 
with murder, the Metropolitan Police eventually concluded that there was no realistic 
prospect of them leaving Russia to face trial. At this point, the Coroner’s Inquest that had 
initially been opened into Litvinenko’s death resumed its work, but was then adjourned 
pending resolution of the dispute over whether, as Marina Litvinenko and Owen himself 
argued, a public inquiry into the event should take place. Following protracted legal 
argument, and in the days following the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 
over eastern Ukraine, Home Secretary Theresa May announced that a public inquiry would 
take place after all (May 2014).  
Here it is relevant to draw out some of the ways in which the Inquiry was itself 
enacted as an event. The Inquiry took place within the framework of the Inquiries Act 2005, 
which sets out the parameters within which such investigations are to be configured and 
conducted, but its Chair went to great lengths to emphasise the importance of due process. 
One expression of this was the care was taken by the Chair concerning the kind of 
inferences that might be drawn from the polonium trail with regard to bodies, space and 
time. On the one hand, the Report records the judgement that a positive finding of 
contamination ‘calls for explanation’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 112) in terms of the 
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conjunction between polonium and a particular person at a particular location at a 
particular time. However, a negative finding might mean that the relevant person was not 
contaminated at a particular location and time, but it might also mean that a contaminated 
person did not transfer polonium onto any surface at that point, or that contamination had 
decayed or been cleaned away. Therefore no particular significance was to be attached to 
the absence of contamination. This approach was also reflected in the extent to which 
Owen sought to interrogate and reject conspiracy theories and other fanciful or speculative 
ideas concerning the event. Polonium did not speak for itself, nor was it only enacted 
through technical practices, knowledge and representatives (Latour 2005a), but nor was it 
taken, in and of itself, to indicate directly a political character to the event; rather its role in 
and significance for the event was made to emerge through a performative enactment of 
analytical process, logic and judgement. 
 As the Oxford English Dictionary (OED 2018: II.4.a) states, the word ‘evidence’ has 
come to carry the meaning of ‘[i]nformation (in the form of personal or documented 
testimony or the production of material objects), tending or used to establish facts in a legal 
investigation’. The word additionally carries the meaning of ‘[g]rounds for belief; facts or 
observations adduced in support of a conclusion or statement the available body of 
information indicating whether an opinion or proposition is true or valid’ (OED 2018: III.6.a). 
Objects and narratives become ‘evidence’, or ‘testimony’, by virtue of their transformation 
in specific intentional and institutional contexts and practices, in which they are taken to 
point towards something, in this case an event. Objects are therefore assembled by, as well 
as assembling of, inquiries-in-public.  
 The distinctiveness and importance of the polonium evidence was recognised by the 
Inquiry. Having outlined the conventional forms of evidence, the Chair stated that ‘in 
addition to’ these, ‘it became apparent that there was a highly unusual, in fact 
unprecedented, line of inquiry to be followed’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 109). As the Chair 
further stated, ‘I shall refer not only to the extensive witness and documentary evidence 
that has been adduced, but also to the body of evidence arising from the testing for 
radioactive contamination’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 109, emphasis added). Polonium in 
some ways assembled the Inquiry, but it was enacted there as evidence via representations 
and representatives. There was a 265-page collection of radiation schedules, listing the 
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results of testing at 56 ‘scenes’ of relevance to the investigation and a further eight that 
were also tested, some of which encompassed dozens of individual surfaces and objects. 
Polonium further became evidence via the testimony of the doctors who treated Litvinenko, 
of A1, of experts on nuclear matters, and via a number of sketches, diagrams and 3D model 
images of some of the scenes. Polonium also appears as evidence via letters, reports and 
certificates concerning plane seats, and in documents emerging from medical examinations. 
It is further possible that polonium was mentioned in the ‘closed evidence’, which the Chair 
had determined necessary to the investigation and was able to access, but which could not 
be disclosed, having been assessed by the Home Secretary ‘as being too sensitive to put into 
the public domain’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 181). Some kinds of evidence were therefore 
material to the public findings of the Inquiry, but did not themselves become public. 
Interpreting such things along with other materials, polonium was adduced (that is, 
cited as evidence) in the Chair’s narrative of the event, which set out a chain of reasoning as 
to what was either supported or excluded by the available material. The Report of the 
Inquiry thus moves from enacting the event as a matter of concern (Latour 2005a; de Goede 
2014) to ‘findings of fact’, expressed according to a series of legal standards, explained by 
the Chair: 
 
In making findings of fact I have adopted the ‘flexible and variable’ approach to the standard of proof 
… I add that where in this Report I state that ‘I am sure’ I will have found a fact to the criminal 
standard. When I use such expressions as ‘I find’ or ‘I am satisfied’ the standard of proof will have 
been the ordinary civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. Where it is obvious that 
I have found a fact but I have not used one of these terms, the standard will have been the civil 
standard. All other expressions, such as a reference to a state of affairs being ‘possible’ will not be a 
finding of fact, but will indicate my state of mind in respect of the issue being considered. (Litvinenko 
Inquiry 2016: 10) 
 
This last statement is important in terms of how the Report stated only that the polonium 
‘could’ have come from Russia. However, the Chair felt able to state that he was ‘sure’ that 
the cause of the cardiac arrest as a result of which Litvinenko died ‘was acute radiation 
syndrome’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 184) and that this ‘was caused by Mr Litvinenko 
ingesting approximately 4.4GBq of polonium 210 on 1 November 2006’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 
2016: 185). As rephrased ‘in everyday language’, the Chair stated that ‘I conclude that Mr 
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Litvinenko was fatally poisoned with polonium 210 on 1 November 2006’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 
2016: 185). He was further ‘sure’ that this happened while drinking tea in the Pine Bar on 
that date, given the primary contamination found there and other corroborating evidence. 
The pattern of contamination further allowed the idea that Litvinenko had accidentally 
poisoned himself or committed suicide to be ruled out. Based on the hair sample and other 
evidence, the Chair also expressed himself ‘sure’ that Litvinenko had earlier ingested a 
smaller dose of polonium, and that this was ‘likely to have been received’ at the meeting on 
16 October. Crucially, the Chair stated that he was ‘sure that Lugovoy and Kovtun placed the 
polonium in the teapot at the Pine Bar on 1 November’, that ‘they did this with the intention 
of poisoning Mr Litvinenko’ and ‘that they knew they were using a deadly poison’, while 
believing that they did not know precisely what the substance was or ‘the nature of all its 
properties’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 192). Through this evidentiary reasoning, the 
materiality of polonium was publicly established to have been deployed, and to have acted, 
in accordance with the intention of targeting and killing Litvinenko, as it in fact came to do. 
 The use of polonium was also taken to point beyond Lugovoy and Kovtun, not only 
towards a nuclear complex from which it must have emerged, but also to political actors 
and intentions. As the Chair found, the two had neither the means to obtain the quantities 
of polonium used, nor a plausible personal motive to kill Litvinenko. As he stated, ‘[a]ll the 
evidence points in one direction, namely that, when they killed Mr Litvinenko, Mr Lugovoy 
and Mr Kovtun were acting on behalf of someone else’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 209, 
emphasis added). Here the Inquiry found that ‘the use of polonium 210 is at the very least a 
strong indicator of state involvement’. In exploring this, the Chair made reference to a 
‘pattern of events’ that was taken to suggest that ‘the Russian state may have been involved 
in the assassination of Mr Putin’s critics’ and that it ‘may have sponsored attacks against its 
opponents, including radioactive poisons’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 231); it also noted that 
‘leading opponents of President Putin, including those living outside Russia, were at risk of 
assassination. One of the risks they faced was that of being poisoned’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 
2016: 233). Overall, the open evidence was taken to establish ‘a strong circumstantial case 
that the Russian State was responsible for Mr Litvinenko’s death’. A further difference that 
‘security’ makes to our understanding of materiality and events here, is indicated by the fact 
that it was having considered the ‘closed’ evidence that the Inquiry found Lugovoy to have 
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been, with ‘strong probability’, acting under the direction of the FSB, as had Kovtun, 
‘possibly indirectly through Mr Lugovoy but probably to his knowledge’ (Litvinenko Inquiry 
2016: 240). Taking account of ‘all of the evidence and analysis available’, the Inquiry 
concluded that the operation was ‘probably’ approved by the director of the FSB and by 
President Putin (Litvinenko Inquiry 2016: 240, emphasis added). 
 Polonium 210 was the central material actant in the event, which it enacted in ways 
that were amenable to tracing. While this tracing was already ‘evidential’ in a number of 
ways, the Inquiry enacted a particular kind of evidential reassembly of the event, not just in 
terms of matters of fact, but of likelihood, probability and possibility. In evidential terms, 
the strength of associations between polonium and other aspects of the event, and the 
corresponding level of ‘facticity’ asserted by the Inquiry, intensify as one moves closer in 
space and time towards the fatal convergence of the event in Litvinenko’s body. In this 
convergence there is no distinguishing between politics and materiality. Polonium becomes 
politics and politics becomes polonium; nuclearity and enmity are enacted in new ways and 
the event begins to assemble new publics. 
 
Conclusions  
The poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko by means of polonium 210 in London in 2006 was an 
event that proved fatal to Litvinenko himself and which devastated his family and 
associates. It also activated a range of official agencies concerned with security and 
disrupted life in the heart of a global city. Investigations of the event reached into airline 
networks and cities in Russia and Germany, and the workings of post-Soviet Russian politics 
as well as the affairs of risk and security consultancies serving a range of interests. In 
assembling testimony, expertise and evidence and coming to a reasoned series of 
judgements, the Litvinenko Inquiry offers an opportunity to revisit the event with which it 
was concerned, and to consider the processes whereby matters of security become, and are 
made, public. 
 Approaching the killing of Litvinenko via the Litvinenko Inquiry suggests a number of 
qualifications to ongoing work informed by materially-oriented approaches and dingpolitik 
in particular. As some writers have emphasised, such approaches cannot simply be applied 
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to the field of security, but they are useful in drawing attention to things that are under-
specified or bracketed out of conventional theories of politics and the public and because 
they are concerned precisely with ontological and epistemological multiplicity and 
instability. They are also useful in directing us to work through the details of specific cases, 
paying attention to the role of expertise and the ways in which things morph, as issues, 
disputes and controversies unfold. Here I have suggested making the idea of the event not 
just an ontological and epistemological concern, but a central analytical strategy in such 
work. Working through events in detail allows us to explore the ways in which intensive 
transformations animate, unsettle, and are mediated by, the workings of the security field. 
Public inquiries into matters of security are particularly useful here not just because they are 
assembled in relation to questions of materiality, but also to the extent that they 
themselves forward an ontology and epistemology of the event. While following events 
through inquiries is in some ways an indirect way of approaching things, it allows us to 
explore how the materiality of security is enacted, mediated and made public in a number 
of different registers amid, and in relation to, myriad other occurrences and happenings. 
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